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This essay expands upon an earlier work (Grodzinsky and Tavani, 2005) in which we 
analyzed the implications of the Verizon v RIAA case for P2P Networks vis-à-vis 
concerns affecting personal privacy and intellectual property. In the present essay we 
revisit some of the concerns surrounding this case by analyzing the intellectual property 
and privacy issues that emerged in the MGM Studios v. Grokster case.  These two cases 
illustrate some of the key tensions that exist between privacy and property interests in 
cyberspace.  In our analysis, we contrast Digital Rights Management (DRM) and 
Interoperability and we examine some newer distribution models of sharing over P2P 
networks.  We also analyze some privacy implications in the two cases in light of the 
theory of privacy as contextual integrity (Nissenbaum, 2004).         
 
1.  Introduction 
This essay9 expands upon an earlier work (Grodzinsky and Tavani, 2005) in which we 
analyzed the implications of  the Verizon v RIAA case for P2P Networks vis-à-vis 
concerns affecting personal privacy and intellectual property. In the present essay, we 
analyze some implications for intellectual property by drawing some analogies to the 
ruling in the MGM Studios v. Grokster case, which demonstrates that the debate over 
sharing copyrighted material in P2P systems has not been limited to copyrighted music 
files. In particular, we question whether the Verizon and Grokster cases advance the 
interests of copyright owners at the expense of preserving privacy for individual users.  
We also question whether the rulings in these two cases threaten new technologies in 
order to advance the interest of copyright owners.  We then examine some privacy 
implications surrounding these cases in light of the theory of privacy as contextual 
integrity (Nissenbaum, 2004). Although we disagree with the tactics used by the 
recording and movie industries to track down individuals who download unauthorized 
proprietary content from the Internet, we do not defend copyright violation. However, we 
also believe that some alternative strategies need to be examined in this debate. 
 
                                                 
9 An earlier version of this essay was presented at the 11th International Conference on the Social and 
Ethical Impacts of Information and Communications Technologies,  University of Mantua, Italy, September 
2008, and printed in the ETHICOMP 2008 Conference Proceedings, 2008, pp. 373-383. 
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2.  A Brief Review of the Verizon v. RIAA and the MGM v. Grokster Cases: 
Implications for the Future of P2P Systems 
We begin by providing some background information in the Verizon and MGM cases, 
including the timeline in each. In January 2003, U.S. District Court in Washington D.C. 
ruled that Verizon must comply with the subpoena issued by the Recording Industry 
Association of America (RIAA) requesting the name of a subscriber who allegedly made 
available more than 600 copyrighted music files over the Internet. Subpoena power 
applies to all Internet service providers within the scope of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA), not just to those service providers storing information on a 
system or network at the direction of a user.  On December 19, 2003 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia overturned the lower court’s decision 
alleging that the DMCA applied only to those sites hosting illegal content and not to 
those simply transmitting it.   
 
The debate over sharing copyrighted material in P2P systems has not been limited to 
copyrighted music files (e.g., as argued in the Verizon case). The motion picture industry 
has also been concerned about the ease with which copyrighted movies can be freely 
exchanged in file-sharing systems.  In 2003, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (MGM) sued two 
P2P file-sharing services, alleging that over 90% of the material exchanged on Grokster 
was copyrighted material and that the P2P service was legally liable. The lower district 
court and the Court of Appeals ruled that Grokster could not be held liable for the 
distribution of copyrighted material because: it lacked sufficient knowledge of the 
infringement; it did not materially contribute to the copyright infringement. MGM 
appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court. During the oral arguments, the justices 
seemed to be divided between two principles: the need to "protect new technologies" 
(such as P2P networks) and the need to provide "remedies against copyright 
infringement.” The Court unanimously confirmed that using Grokster's service to trade 
copyrighted material is illegal (but the Court did not agree that P2P technology should be 
made illegal). This decision reflected the tension to protect new technologies as well as 
copyright holders.     
 
What are some of the implications of the Court’s decisions in these two cases for the 
future of P2P technology?  Whereas the appeals process in the Verizon case can arguably 
be interpreted as favoring the privacy rights of individual users in P2P networks, we 
believe that the US Supreme Court in the MGM appeals tended to side with property 
right holders. However, the Court’s ruling does not necessarily threaten innovative 
technologies such as P2P systems, despite the efforts of some property right holders to 
eliminate P2P systems altogether.   
 
The Verizon and MGM cases illustrate ethical challenges that affect both privacy and 
property.  The conflict between privacy and property rights in cyberspace can be 
understood as a tension involving “access and control” (Tavani, 2004). Whereas 
property-rights advocates argue for greater control over information they view to be 
proprietary (thereby restricting access to that information by ordinary persons), privacy 
advocates argue for individuals having greater control over their own personal 
information (thus restricting access to that information by entrepreneurs).  In the next 
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section of this essay, we examine some property-related issues affecting the two cases. 
Privacy-related concerns are examined in Section 4. 
 
3. Property-Related Issues Affecting the Verizon and MGM Cases 
In an earlier essay (Grodzinsky and Tavani, 2005), we discussed Jessica Litman’s 
concern that the extension to the Copyright Act of 1976 has contributed to the shrinking 
of the public domain by extending the scope of copyright to anything that is potentially 
copyrightable. Litman (2003) offers up a distribution model whereby the default is to 
share and therefore expand the public domain.  Since then several other distribution 
models have emerged that concern online file sharing.   
 
3.1 Distribution Models 
By the year 2012, it is estimated that 40% of the global music market will be digital 
music (Evans, 2008).  If more than 60 million users are sharing music over the Internet, 
and if many composers are not getting compensated adequately, then a fair distribution 
model that balances copyright with contextual privacy would be desirable.  In an attempt 
to address some current inequities affecting copyright, a cluster of distribution models 
based on subscription fees have emerged since the publication of our last paper. In 
particular, many of these models are directed at servicing online music stores and 
portable MP3 players.   The most popular of these models, iTunes is compatible with the 
iPod, Apple’s MP3 player.  On Demand Distribution (OD2) is another distribution model 
that is popular in Europe. Nokia purchased it in 2006 for use on mobile phones. 
Streaming media is yet another distribution model and is found in Internet radio.  
 
3.1.1 The iTunes model 
In the iTunes online music store, users are now downloading one and a quarter million 
songs per day, which is an annual run rate of almost half a billion songs per year. The 
contract that iTunes users sign in order to download their music strictly describes what 
they can or cannot do with the songs that they download.  As for now, the proprietary 
nature of Apple software prevents downloading onto other portable devices; the 
distribution model is limited to iPods. However, iPods do play open format CD’s not 
purchased from iTunes.  This raises concerns about a possible “distribution monopoly.”10 
 
Apple has implemented a technology known as Fair Play DRM in an effort to stop illegal 
file sharing activities, and this technology is now active on all but the EMI music catalog. 
On April 3, 2007, EMI, one of the big four announced that it would sell its music without 
DRM on the iTunes music store.  Non-DRM formatted music will cost slightly more than 
the $0.99 cents DRM version.  This move will pave the way for others to follow suit 
(Felton, 2007).   There will be no great loss for the big four: EMI, Sony BMG, Universal 
and Warner, as less than 3% of all music played on iPods is purchased from iTunes, and 
therefore, protected with DRM (Jobs, 2007). More than 90% of music is sold DRM free.  
                                                 
10 The issue of a “distribution monopoly” is beyond the scope of this essay. However, we should point out 
that Apple worries that if it opens up its DRM (Digital Rights Management) algorithm to others, it would 
lose the ability to protect its music, which would cause it to lose its distribution rights. (DRM, and some 
controversies surrounding it, are briefly examined in Section 3.2 of this essay.) 
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Steve Jobs believes that if DRM restrictions were lifted, there might be an influx of new 
stores and players. (Jobs, 2007) 
 
3.1.2 On Demand Distribution 
At one time, OD2 was the primary download technology for online music stores in 
Europe.  The European community is now looking at distribution models that work on 
standards that anyone could license, and so they are opposed to the monopolistic 
approach of Apple.  Yet they are no longer satisfied with OD2 because of the 
interoperability problems that model has had. As noted above, Nokia purchased OD2 in 
2006 in order to use it on its mobile phones.   It is unclear, however, whether Nokia 
support will bring OD2 back as a serious contender in the digital music arena in Europe 
(Finlayson, 2006).  Also, we should note that if Microsoft launches its own portable 
digital player, this product would have the potential to compete with Apple.  No one has 
yet solved the interoperability issue, as online music stores typically service their own 
hardware. 
 
3.1.3 Streaming Media  
Video and audio streaming each have their own set of problems (whose details go beyond 
the scope of this essay). In video format, user-created content can be developed and used, 
but any content that is copyrighted can only be used with permission of the copyright 
holder. Who owns the copyright? Often there are several layers of “middlemen.” We 
believe that Lessig’s Creative Commons (CC) License would be helpful, if the goal is to 
broaden the public domain and make sharing easier. 
 
The current growth rate for Internet radio is 27% per year, as compared to the 1% annual 
growth rate for traditional radio (Siglin, 2007).   Internet radio stations that use audio 
streaming have been under attack by the Library of Congress Royalty Board, who issues 
royalty fees and who have been trying to revise the fee structure retroactive to 2006 
(Siglin, 2007).  How would this affect Internet Radio?  “AOL Radio, LaunchCast, 
ClearChannel and Live365 would be billed $363 million during the same year that all 
14,000 US radio stations combined would be billed $550 million” (Siglin, 2007). The 
tension between the Royalty Board and Internet radio was created in part by Sound 
Exchange, representatives of the record companies who  “…sought the royalty amid a 
drop in compact disc sales that fell 20% from 2004-2006”(Tirrell, 2007).   
 
It would seem that the case audio streaming can be viewed as one more instance in which 
proprietary interests are shrinking the public domain and thwarting new technologies 
from further development.  Yahoo and AOL may have to shut down their Internet radio 
stations. In an attempt to nullify the ruling of the Copyright Royalty Board, the Internet 
Radio Equality Act was proposed in the Senate in May 2007.   
 
3.2 Privately Preserving Property: DRM Vs. Interoperability 
Digital Rights Management (DRM) technology can be defined as “Technology that 
protects a piece of intellectual digital property such as a music, video, or text file. With 
DRM, copyrighted material downloaded from the Web may be restricted so that it cannot 
be freely distributed” (http://h71036.www7.hp.com/hho/cache/281-0-0-225-121.html). 
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Because DRM builds a “digital fence” around a piece of copyrighted content, and allows 
only certain authorized access or use, it can be viewed as posing a significant obstacle to 
online file sharing.  In the US, according to the DMCA, it is illegal to circumvent this 
technology for any reason; so the user has no legal recourse except to abandon his/her 
attempt to use the protected content.  Current DRM schemes tip the balance in favor of 
the copyright owner who can determine how and by whom his/her content may be used.  
For that reason, DRM has become an obstacle to private use because it limits the user’s 
freedom, by allowing private interests to define the parameters of the law.  For users in 
DRM systems to preserve their fair use rights, they must be able to access material 
anonymously and to use content without authorization or demand for compensation 
(Armstrong, 2006).  For more on issues affecting private use as “fair use”, see 
Grodzinsky and Bottis (2007).   
 
In the context of online music sharing, there is a tension between DRM and 
interoperability.  Interoperability enables users to download and play music on a variety 
of devices.  This ability also challenges the notion that downloadable content can and 
should be restricted to proprietary devices controlled by the company that owns the 
online store.  France is perceived to have led the way in interoperability when in March, 
2006 its National Assembly passed a law that would force distributors of online music in 
France to remove DRM so that music can be played on any device.  Any company using 
proprietary music formats would be affected by this law, which may pave the way for 
other EU countries to follow (Hesseldahl, 2006).  However, many distributors of music 
content believe that legally pushing interoperability will result in opening the door to file 
sharing of copyrighted material without compensation. 
 
It is encouraging that EMI has agreed to distribute non-DRM music on the iTunes 
platform.  On the one hand, opening up the distribution of music online might encourage 
other subscription services to follow suit. On the other hand, while these developments 
can be viewed as attempts to move in the right direction, unfortunately, the fair 
distribution of media might reduce but not totally eliminate unauthorized online file 
sharing of proprietary music.   However, we do not subscribe to the recent attempts by 
the RIAA at lawsuits and lobbying in Congress for bills that tie penalties to online file 
sharing, especially those schemes that do so at the expense of personal privacy. 
 
4. Context Based Theories of Privacy 
In our earlier essay (Grodzinsky and Tavani, 2005), we described some of the difficulties 
one encounters when attempting to give a precise definition of privacy. There, we also 
distinguished between descriptive privacy and normative privacy, and we differentiated 
among three types of privacy: accessibility privacy, decisional privacy, and informational 
privacy. In our analysis of the Verizon case we also defended a theory of privacy 
advanced by Moor (1990, 1997) and expanded upon by Tavani and Moor (2001). Key 
aspects of this privacy framework, which we refer to as the RALC (Restricted 
Access/Limited Control) theory of privacy, are more fully explicated in Tavani (2007, 
2008). So, we will not repeat the details of RALC here. However, we should note that 
one virtue of RALC that is crucial for our discussion of privacy in the present essay is 
that it is a context-based privacy theory that appeals to the notion of a “situation” in 
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determining whether a particular context, such as a P2P network, warrants normative 
privacy protection. 
 
4.1 Privacy as Contextual Integrity 
We have already noted how the RALC theory was helpful in analyzing P2P networks 
used in the Verizon case from the perspective of normative privacy protection. In this 
section, we show how a context-based theory of privacy such as Helen Nissenbaum’s 
“contextual integrity” theory can also help us to understand the issues at stake for 
individual privacy in the debate about P2P environments.11 We should note at the outset 
that Nissenbaum describes her privacy framework as a “benchmark theory,” rather than a 
full-fledged theory of privacy (Nissenbaum 2004). However, we believe that her 
framework is sufficiently developed to inform the privacy debate in cases such as 
Verizon and MGM. How, exactly, does her privacy theory enable us to do this? First, we 
should note that Nissenbaum’s theory requires that the processes used in gathering and 
disseminating information are “appropriate to a particular context” and that they comply 
with the “governing norms of distribution” for that context (Nissenbaum, 101). This 
insight expands upon her earlier work on the problem of “privacy in public” 
(Nissenbaum, 1997, 1998), where she notes that normative privacy protection does not 
typically apply to personal information gathered about us in what she describes as the 
“public sphere.” For example, she points out that privacy norms (whether in the form of 
explicit privacy laws or informal privacy policies) protect personal information 
considered to be intimate and sensitive. This generally includes personal information 
such as medical records and financial records. However, normative privacy protection 
does not generally extend to personal information about us that can be gathered from our 
activities in public places – e.g., places where we shop, dine, recreate, and so forth.  
 
Some of the core concerns affecting the problem of privacy in public, introduced in 
Nissenbaum’s earlier essays, are also illustrated in her theory of privacy as contextual 
integrity (Nissenbaum 2004). Two key principles underlying Nissenbaum’s later privacy 
theory are: 
(i) the activities people engage in take place in a “plurality of realms” (i.e., 
spheres or contexts) 
(ii) each realm has a distinct set of norms that govern its aspects.  
 
These principles or norms both shape and limit or restrict our roles, behavior, and 
expectations by governing the flow of personal information in a given context.12   
 
Additionally, Nissenbaum (2004) distinguishes between two types of informational 
norms: (a) norms of appropriateness, and (b) norms of distribution. The first of these 
determines whether a given type of personal information is either appropriate or 
inappropriate to divulge within a particular context. According to Nissenbaum, (138), 
these norms “circumscribe the type or nature of information about various individuals 
                                                 
11 My description of Nissenbaum’s privacy theory in this section closely parallels my accounts in Tavani 
(2008, in press). 
12 The contextual integrity model proceeds on the assumption that there are “no areas of life are not 
governed by norms of information flow” (Nissenbaum 2004, 137). 
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that, within a given context, is allowable, expected, or even demanded to be revealed.” 
Contrast these norms with those of distribution, which restrict the flow of information 
within and across contexts. Nissenbaum (125) believes that when either of these norms is 
“breached,” a violation of privacy occurs. On the contrary, the contextual integrity of the 
flow of personal information is maintained when both kinds of norms are “respected.” 13   
 
Nissenbaum argues that her contextual integrity theory improves upon the leading 
alternative privacy theories in at least two key respects. For one thing, she notes that 
personal information that is revealed or disclosed in a particular context is always 
“tagged” with that context and thus is never “up for grabs.” Because alternative privacy 
theories lack the appropriate “mechanisms” to prevent the “anything goes” approach to 
this kind of personal information, 14 Nissenbaum believes that those theories cannot grant 
normative protection to the kinds of personal information gathered in public places, A 
second key respect in which her theory differs from alternative accounts can be found in 
her claim that the “scope of informational norms” is always “internal to a given context” 
– i.e., the norms are “relative” or “non-universal” (Nissenbaum 125). She also points out 
that in her theory, “context-relative qualifications” can be “built right into the 
informational norms” of any given context, unlike other normative theories of privacy 
where these qualifications tend to be treated as “exceptions or tradeoffs” (Nissenbaum, 
138).15 
 
As in the case of the RALC framework mentioned above, Nissenbaum’s theory illustrates 
why we must always attend to the context in which information flows, not the nature of 
the information itself, in determining whether normative protection is needed.16  Like 
RALC, Nissenbaum’s framework of privacy as contextual integrity can be applied to a 
wide range of contemporary technologies to determine whether they breach the 
informational privacy norms that govern specific contexts.17 
                                                 
13 Nissenbaum argues that there are no information or spheres of life for which “anything goes.”  As 
Nissenbaum (2004, 128) states: “Almost everything – things that we do, events that occur, transactions that 
take place – happens in a context…” In her scheme, contexts include “spheres of life” such as education, 
politics, the marketplace, and so forth.  
14 Nissenbaum (1998) points out that when it comes to questions about how to protect personal information 
in public contexts, or in what she calls “spheres other than the intimate,” most normative accounts of 
privacy have a theoretical “blind spot.” 
15 In this sense, she believes that her theory allows for the possibility of “context-relative variation” as an 
“integral part of contextual integrity.” 
16 Rather than focusing on the nature of the information included in a P2P situation – i.e., asking whether or 
not it should be viewed as private – we can ask whether P2P situations or contexts (in general) deserve 
protection as “normatively private situations” (Moor) or contexts (Nissenbaum). In the RALC framework, 
Moor (1997) includes a scenario involving information about faculty salaries for professors who teach at 
public institutions funded by tax-payers vs. small, privately owned colleges, to illustrate this point. He 
notes that there is nothing inherent in the information about the professors’ salaries per se that is helpful in 
determining whether it was appropriate to protect that information. Instead, Moor argues that it is the 
specific “situation” or context – in particular, the norms governing the flow of information in the context of 
a large public university vs. a small private college – that determined whether it is appropriate to grant such 
information normative protection. 
17 For example, Nissenbaum’s account of the problem of privacy in public, in conjunction with her 
framework of contextual integrity, can help us to better understand the kinds of privacy threats posed by 
data-mining technology (Tavani, 2007). For an interesting discussion of how Nissenbaum’s theory of 
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5.  Extending Contextual Integrity To P2P Contexts  
How can Nissenbaum’s account of privacy as contextual integrity be applied to P2P 
contexts?  Before attempting to extend the theory of Contextual Integrity to P2P 
networks, we first respond to the challenge of whether a P2P environment can count as a 
context.18 For example, some might object that P2P networks lack explicit norms for 
governing the behavior of its participants and thus might not qualify as a conventional 
“context” – at least not in a normative sense. Against such an objection, we note that P2P 
environments have implicit rules that govern the behavior of participants as well as 
explicit privacy policies in some cases. But consider that even in the absence of explicit 
rules governing all of our day-to-day activities, many of our cultural norms (in general) 
are based upon adherence to implicit rather than explicit rules. So, for our purposes, we 
can assume that a P2P network is an example of a context that is governed by rules.  
 
We believe that Nissenbaum’s theory of privacy as contextual integrity shows why it is 
inappropriate for the RIAA to have access to personal information that belongs to a P2P 
context.  For one thing, P2P users have an expectation of privacy based in part on the 
privacy policies and   the distributed architectures (e.g. Bit Torrent) that were created, in 
part, to preserve the anonymity of the clients.  According to the norms of appropriateness, 
IP addresses that enable file sharing among clients are appropriate to those involved in 
the sharing process.  In some highly distributed models, these address strings are further 
randomized to preserve anonymity, even among those sharing files.  According to the 
norms of distribution, email accounts as well as upgrades about P2P services are 
available to those who choose to create accounts and subscribe to the services; these are 
used solely within the P2P service and are not shared with third parties.  Privacy policies 
on the Morpheus and Bit Torrent Web sites outline the terms of distribution of personal 
information.  Following the Napster, Grokster and Verizon cases, some “context-relevant 
qualifications” have emerged on these sites.  For example, Bit Torrent’s policy says,   
Notwithstanding any other term of this Privacy Policy, we may release any 
personal information we obtain or collect when we believe its release is 
appropriate to comply with the law, enforce our Site policies, or protect ours or 
others' rights, property, or safety (http://www.bittorrent.com/privacy?csrc=splash).  
 
Morpheus, distributed by StreamCast Networks, makes a similar claim, when it asserts: 
StreamCast does not condone copyright, patent or other intellectual property 
infringement. Due to the nature of peer-to-peer software, StreamCast Networks is 
unable to monitor or control the files searched for or shared using Morpheus. If 
you locate any material being shared by a user who you believe may be in violation 
of copyright or other intellectual property law, please report your concerns to that 
user directly. This is not intended to be legal advice or counsel. If you have any 
questions consult your attorney. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
contextual integrity can be applied to privacy issues involving “vehicle-safety communications 
technologies,” see Zimmer (2005). 
18 For example, Richard Volkman has posed this question to us in a conversation about “P2P contexts.” 
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This approach preserves the flow of distribution and does not assume the role of cyber 
police.  The next part of the policy defines its “context-relevant” qualifications. 
Morpheus® values your anonymity and privacy. Morpheus does not contain or 
bundle malicious spyware. Upon being served with valid subpoenas or warrants, 
Morpheus will cooperate with governmental agencies to eliminate and prosecute 
trafficking in child pornography and other similar crimes  
(http://www.morpheus.com/notices.asp).                                                                                                        
 
So while many of these P2P systems claim that they condemn sharing of copyrighted 
material, and while they say that they will cooperate with legitimate legal actions, (not 
requests of the entertainment industry), only Morpheus specifies that crimes on the level 
of child pornography will cause it to alter its norm of distribution.   
 
Because the RIAA has been technologically thwarted in its attempt to obtain information 
about users from P2P networks directly, it has tried to get that information by other 
means. Typically, file sharers connect to P2P networks through either their ISP’s or their 
university’s networks.  These two discrete contexts connect to the P2P context; however, 
there is also information that crosses contexts (i.e., flows from one to the other).  We 
have argued elsewhere (Grodzinsky and Tavani, 2005) that the RIAA seems to assume 
that its property interests automatically trump the privacy rights of P2P users. By 
threatening ISP’s and universities with legal action, the RIAA hopes to obtain private 
information that can be used to identify file sharers on the P2P networks.  We believe that 
this kind of behavior is a violation of privacy according to Nissenbaum’s theory.19  
 
To see how the privacy violation occurs, consider the following scheme. In most 
universities in the United States, student privacy is protected.  There are explicit policies 
in place that inform who may or may not have access to a student’s personal information.  
In fact, on many campuses, parents may not have access to his or her child’s grades or to 
information about the child’s professors without explicit consent from the student.  So, 
the flow of information within the university context is quite restricted.  Consider that 
university networks are part of the university context – i.e., they are owned and operated 
by the university and, we believe, fall under their privacy rules.  When students use the 
university network to connect to a P2P network to file share, they move from a private 
network to an openly distributed one, thus crossing contexts.  The RIAA’s inability to 
control file sharing through technology within the P2P’s has led it to increase its attempts 
to force universities as well as ISP’s to assume the role of cyber police effectively, 
placing the burden of enforcement on the university. This usually conflicts with the 
university’s existing privacy policies. Thus, we believe that capitulation by the 
universities and ISP’s based on threats from private industry would constitute a clear 
violation of privacy, according to Nissenbaum’s theory. 
 
In a more expansive and systematic attempt to control downloading on university 
campuses, the RIAA has recently tried to tie the unauthorized downloading of files by 
                                                 
19 For a view that is more sympathetic to Verizon in this dispute, see Spinello (2004). We should also point 
out that Spinello (2008) supports a position that is more sympathetic to MGM than the one we defend in 
this essay. 
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students to a loss of financial aid. Legislation introduced in November 2007 to amend 
and extend the Higher Education Bill of 1965 includes the controversial Section 494, 
entitled Campus-based digital theft prevention.  Sunny Kalara, an intellectual property 
attorney, explains, “Each eligible institution participating in the federal aid program shall: 
provide annual disclosure/warnings to the students applying for or receiving financial aid, 
stating that: P2P file sharing may subject them to civil and criminal liability” (Kalara, 
2007).  Students applying for or receiving financial aid, stating that: P2P file sharing may 
subject them to civil and criminal liability” (Kalara, 2007).  The bill demands that the 
universities offer subscription services to their student bodies that will give them an 
alternative to illegal file sharing.   The American Association of Universities has written 
to the proponents of the bill expressing their outrage and asking them to remove the P2P 
section.  Otherwise, innocent students could be caught up in a sweep that would penalize 
them and deprive them of much needed financial aid, if universities do not comply. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
If we accept Nissenbaum’s context-based approach to privacy controversies affecting 
P2P networks, in conjunction with one or more of the distribution models, that we 
examined, we can both protect privacy interests of individuals and help ensure that 
property owners’ interests are also reasonably preserved. Following DeCew (1997), we 
believe in a “presumption in favor of privacy” as the default starting position in debates 
affecting privacy and other interests, such as property. We also argue that P2P networks 
are contextually private situations and, as such, protecting privacy in the debate involving 
Verizon and the RIAA is essential. In the MGM case, we believe that the Courts failed to 
appreciate the contextual aspect of P2P systems in its ruling. Even though the Court 
upheld the legitimacy of P2P systems and their importance to technological innovation, 
the majority opinion expressed by the Court did not recognize the significant implications 
its decision had for the privacy of users of P2P systems. We believe that if the US 
Supreme Court, in deciding the MGM case, had taken into consideration the contextual 
nature of P2P networks and the kind of privacy protection that is warranted by such 
contexts, the Court may have reached a different conclusion. 
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